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2. This territory has been much worked over.
8 I am not going to work over it any more; I have sketched this picture of the state of play, in a certain region of recent discussion of transcendental arguments, only to bring out a contrast. I am not going to consider transcendental arguments of either of the two kinds that have come into view so far:
neither the ambitious kind, in which the aim is to establish the truth of general claims about the world; nor the modest kind, in which the aim is to establish only that we cannot consistently go on taking it that our thought and experience are as they are in the relevant respects while withholding acceptance of the relevant claims about the world.
Instead I want to consider a different approach to one sort of scepticism. I want to suggest that this different approach can be pursued through a kind of transcendental argument that belongs to neither of those two types.
The scepticism in question is scepticism about perceptually acquired knowledge of the external world. And the approach in question is diagnostic. The diagnosis is that this scepticism expresses an inability to make sense of the idea of direct perceptual access to objective facts about the environment. What shapes this scepticism is the thought that even in the best possible case, the most that perceptual experience can yield falls short of a subject's having an environmental state of affairs directly available to her. Consider situations in which a subject seems to see that, say, there is a red cube in front of her. The idea is that even if we focus on the best possible case, her experience could be just as it is, in all respects, even if there were no red cube in front of her. This seems to reveal that perceptual experience provides at best inconclusive warrants for claims about the environment. And that seems incompatible with supposing we ever, strictly speaking, know anything about our objective surroundings. 9 The familiar sceptical scenariosDescartes's demon, the scientist with our brains in his vat, the suggestion that all our The relevant characteristic is that experience purports to be of objective reality.
When one undergoes perceptual experience, it at least appears to one as if things in one's environment are a certain way.
Consider Wilfrid Sellars's discussion of "looks" statements in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind". 10 Sellars urges something on the following lines. In order to understand the very idea of the objective purport of visual experience (to single out one sensory modality), we need to appreciate that the concept of experiences in which, say, it looks to one as if there is a red cube in front of one divides into the concept of cases in which one sees that there is a red cube in front of one and the concept of cases in which it merely looks to one as if there is a red cube in front of one (either because there is nothing there at all or because although there is something there it is not a red cube).
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At least implicit here is a thought that can be put as follows. In order to find it intelligible that experience has objective purport at all, we must be able to make sense of an epistemically distinguished class of experiences, those in which (staying with the visual case) one sees how things are -those in which how things are makes itself visually available to one. Experiences in which it merely looks to one as if things are thus and so are experiences that misleadingly present themselves as belonging to that epistemically distinguished class. So we need the idea of experiences that belong to the epistemically distinguished class if we are to comprehend the idea that experiences have objective purport. If one acknowledges that experiences have objective purport, one cannot consistently refuse to make sense of the idea of experiences in which objective facts are directly available to perception.
The scepticism I am considering purports to acknowledge that experiences have objective purport, but nevertheless supposes that appearances as such are mere appearances, in the sense that any experience leaves it an open possibility that things are not as they appear. That is to conceive the epistemic significance of experience as a highest common factor of what we have in cases in which, as common sense would put it, we perceive that things are thus and so and what we have in cases in which that merely seems to be so -so never higher than what we have in the second kind of case. 11 The conception I have found in Sellars can be put, in opposition to that, as a disjunctive conception of perceptual appearance: perceptual appearances are either objective states of affairs making themselves manifest to subjects, or situations in which it is as if an objective state of affairs is making itself manifest to a subject, although that is not how things are. 12 Experiences of the first kind have an epistemic significance that experiences of the second kind do not have. They afford opportunities for knowledge of objective states of affairs. According to the highest common factor conception, appearances can never yield more, in the way of warrant for belief, than do those appearances in which it merely seems that one, say, sees that things are thus and so. But according to the Sellarsian transcendental argument, that thought undermines its own entitlement to the very idea of appearances.
The highest common factor conception is supposedly grounded on a claim that seems unquestionable: the claim that from a subject's point of view, a misleading appearance can be indistinguishable from a case in which things are as they appear. That might be taken as a self-standing claim about the phenomenology of misleading appearance, available to be cited in explaining the fact that subjects can be misled by appearances. So taken, the claim is open to dispute. 13 But the right way to take it is as simply registering the fact that, on that interpretation, it is supposed to explain: the undeniable fact that our capacity to get to know things through perception is fallible.
14 The claim of indistinguishability is supposed to warrant the thought that even in the best case in which a subject, say, has it visually appear to her that there is a red cube in front of her, her experience could be just as it is even if there were no red cube in front of her. But we need a distinction here. When we say her experience could be just as it is even if there were no red cube in front of her, we might be just registering that there could be a misleading experience that from the standpoint of her experience she could not distinguish from her actually veridical experience.
In that case what we say is just a way of acknowledging that our capacity to acquire knowledge through perceptual experience is fallible. It does not follow that even in the best case, the epistemic position constituted by undergoing an experience can be no better than the epistemic position constituted by undergoing a misleading experience, even one that would admittedly be indistinguishable.
The acknowledgement of fallibility cannot detract from the excellence of an epistemic position, with regard to the obtaining of an objective state of affairs, that consists in having the state of affairs present itself to one in one's perceptual experience. This is where the disjunctive conception does its epistemological work. It blocks the inference from the subjective indistinguishability of experiences to the highest common factor conception, according to which neither of the admittedly indistinguishable experiences could have higher epistemic worth than that of the inferior case. And the transcendental argument shows that the disjunctive conception is required, on pain of our losing our grip on the very idea that in experience we have it appear to us that things are a certain way. 4. This transcendental argument starts from the fact that perceptual experience at least purports to be of objective reality, and yields the conclusion that we must be able to make sense of the idea of perceptual experience that is actually of objective reality. I have urged that that is enough to undermine a familiar sort of scepticism about knowledge of the external world.
Now there may be a temptation to object that this argument assumes too much.
Should it be left unquestioned that perceptual experience purports to be of objective reality?
There is plenty of room to argue that it is proper to start there. The sceptical arguments Descartes considers, for instance, do not question the fact that perceptual experience yields appearances that things are objectively the case. Descartes's arguments question only our entitlement to believe that things are as they appear to be. The highest common factor conception owes its attractiveness to the subjective indistinguishability of experiences all of which can be described in terms of the appearance that things are objectively thus and so. This supposed basis for scepticism does not need a more minimal picture of experience.
But what if we do decide that we ought to confront a more whole-hearted scepticism, a scepticism willing to doubt that perceptual experience purports to be of objective reality? Well then, the transcendental argument I have been considering cannot do all the work. But it can still do some of the work. If this is the target, we need a prior transcendental argument, one that reveals the fact that consciousness includes states or episodes that purport to be of objective reality as a necessary condition for some more basic feature of consciousness, perhaps that its states and episodes are potentially self-conscious. Strawson's reading of the Transcendental Deduction in Kant's first Critique might serve, or perhaps the Transcendental Deduction itself. It would take me too far afield to go into this here. The point is just that we cannot dismiss an argument that pivots on the disjunctive conception of perceptual appearance, on the ground that it does not itself establish the characteristic of perceptual experience that it begins from.
5. In a recent paper, Crispin Wright argues that as a response to scepticism, replacing the highest common factor conception of perceptual experience with a disjunctive conception is "dialectically quite ineffectual".
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Wright starts from a helpful account of why G. E. Moore's "proof of an external world" -at least if taken at face value -is as unimpressive as nearly everyone finds it.
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Moore moves from the premise "Here is a hand" to the conclusion, which is indeed entailed by that premise, that there is an external world. Wright takes Moore to suppose that his premise is itself grounded on something yet more basic: something Moore could express by saying "My experience is in all respects as of a hand held up in front of my face". And Wright's diagnosis of what goes wrong in Moore's argument is that the warrant this ground supplies cannot be transmitted across the acknowledged entailment from "Here is a hand" to "There is an external world". The warrant that "My experience is as of a hand" provides for "Here is a hand" is defeasible, and it is defeated if the sceptic is right and we are, for instance, at the mercy of Descartes's demon. We can allow it to warrant the premise of Moore's entailment only if we already take ourselves to be entitled to accept the conclusion of the entailment. So the whole argument is question-begging.
Wright now turns to the disjunctive conception. He sums up his verdict on it as follows (346-7):
In brief: whether our perceptual faculties engage the material world directly [the thesis that the disjunctive conception is aimed at protecting] is one issue and whether the canonical justification of perceptual claims proceeds through a defeasible inferential base is another. One is, so far, at liberty to take a positive view of both issues. But what does this have to do with the disjunctive conception? The point of the disjunctive conception is that if one undergoes an experience that belongs on the "good"
side of the disjunction, that warrants one in believing -indeed presents one with an opportunity to know -that things are as the experience reveals them as being. When one's perceptual faculties "engage the material world directly", as Wright puts it, the result -a case of having an environmental state of affairs directly present to one in experience -constitutes one's being justified in making the associated perceptual claim.
It is hard to see how any other kind of justification could have a stronger claim to the title "canonical". And this justification is not defeasible. If someone sees that P, it cannot fail to be the case that P. So if one accepts the disjunctive conception, one is not at liberty to go on supposing that "the canonical justification of perceptual claims proceeds through a defeasible inferential base".
In urging the contrary, Wright constructs an argument whose starting-point is the whole disjunction. Of course he is right that the whole disjunction could provide at best defeasible support for a perceptual claim. But what he has done is in effect to cast the whole disjunction in the role in which the supposed case for scepticism casts the highest common factor. And the point of the disjunctive conception is precisely to reject the force. The prop is the thought that the warrant for a perceptual claim provided by an experience can never be that the experience reveals how things are. The disjunctive conception dislodges that thought, and a sceptical doubt that depends on it falls to the ground. There is no need to do more than remove the prop. In particular, as I explained before, there is no need to try to establish theses like the conclusion of Moore's argument, with the ground rules for doing so set by scepticism. The idea that such theses are open to doubt now lacks the cachet of simply emphasizing an epistemic predicament constituted by its being impossible for experience to reveal to us how things are. There is no such predicament, and now it is perfectly proper to appeal to cases of ordinary perceptual knowledge in ruling out the sceptical scenarios, or -better -in justifying a common-sense refusal to bother with them.
Wright might be tempted to seize on what I have just said as vindicating his talk of my "official refusal to take scepticism seriously". But like Stroud, I hold that the way to take scepticism seriously is not to try to disprove the sceptical scenarios. We take scepticism seriously by removing the prop, thereby entitling ourselves to join common sense in refusing to bother with the sceptical scenarios.
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Considering the form "Either I am perceiving thus-and-such or I am in some kind of delusional state", Wright offers this reconstruction of the sceptical reasoning that, according to him, survives the disjunctive conception (346):
[I]n this case it is our practice to treat one in particular of the disjuncts as justified -the left-hand one -whenever the disjunction as a whole is justified and there is, merely, no evidence for the other disjunct! That's a manifest fallacy unless the case is one where we have a standing reason to regard the lack of any salient justification for a disjunct of the second type as a reason to discount it. Andthe sceptical thought will be -it's hard to see what could count as a standing reason except a prior entitlement to the belief that delusions are rare. But that's 19 In writing here of a common-sense refusal to bother with the sceptical scenarios, I am echoing a remark at Mind and World, 113 (in the passage Wright cites to document the "official refusal"): "The aim here is not to answer sceptical questions, but to begin to see how it might be intellectually respectable to ignore them, to treat them as unreal, in the way that common sense has always wanted to." Of course it takes work to reach such a position. This attitude can look like a "refusal to take scepticism seriously" only given the picture of what it is to take scepticism seriously that Stroud rejects.
just tantamount to the belief that there is a material world which, at least on the surfaces of things, is pretty much revealed for what it is in what we take to be normal waking experience. So, the Sceptic will contend, that broad conception once again emerges as a rational precondition of our practice, even after the disjunctive adjustment to the concept of perception; and on its warrantedness depends whatever warrant can be given for our proceeding in the way we do.
Since it cannot be warranted by appeal to the warrant for specific perceptual claims -Moore's proof being no better in this setting than before -the Sceptic may now focus on the apparent impossibility of any kind of direct warrant for it, and the dialectic can proceed essentially as before.
It is clearly correct that our practice of assessing the credentials of perceptual claims could not be rational if we were not entitled to the "broad conception" according to which the external world is pretty much the way we take ourselves to experience it as being. But it is tendentious to suppose it follows that the rationality of our practice is in jeopardy, unless the "broad conception" can be warranted in advance of the practice without begging questions against scepticism. And it is wrong to suppose the disjunctive conception leaves unchallenged the idea Wright here exploits, that the justification for a perceptual claim must go through the whole disjunction, exploiting some supposed standing reason for discounting the "bad" disjunct. The justification for a perceptual claim is an entitlement to the "good" disjunct. What entitles one to that is not that one's experience warrants the whole disjunction, plus some supposed ground for discounting the "bad" disjunct. That would commit us to trying to reconstruct the epistemic standing constituted by perceiving something to be the case in terms of the highest common factor conception of experience, plus whatever ground we can think of for discounting the "bad" disjunct. I think Wright is correct that that is hopeless; if we see things this way, the sceptic wins. But the disjunctive conception eliminates the apparent need for any such project, because it contradicts the highest common factor conception.
What does entitle one to claim that one is perceiving that things are thus and so, when one is so entitled? The fact that one is perceiving that things are thus and so. That is a kind of fact whose obtaining our self-consciously possessed perceptual capacities enable us to recognize on suitable occasions, just as they enable us to recognize such facts as that there are red cubes in front of us, and all the more complex types of environmental facts that our powers to perceive things put at our disposal.
Of course we are fallible about the obtaining of such facts, just as we are fallible about the facts we perceive to obtain. I can tell a zebra when I see one -to take up an example Wright borrows from Fred Dretske (342-4) . If what I believe to be a zebra is actually a cunningly painted mule, then of course I do not recognize it as a zebra, as I suppose, and I do not have the warrant I think I have for believing it is a zebra, namely that I see it to be a zebra. My ability to recognize zebras is fallible, and it follows that my ability to know when I am seeing a zebra is fallible. It does not follow -this is the crucial point -that I cannot ever have the warrant for believing that an animal in front of me is a zebra constituted by seeing that it is a zebra. If the animal in front of me is a zebra, and conditions are suitable for exercising my ability to recognize zebras when I see them (for instance, the animal is in full view), then that ability, fallible though it is, enables me to see that it is a zebra, and to know that I do. My warrant is not limited to the disjunction "Either I see that it is a zebra or my visual experience is misleading in some way". That is the highest common factor conception, and fallibility in our cognitive capacities cannot force it on us. 20 6. Transcendental arguments of Stroud's ambitious type aim to establish large-scale features the world must have for it to be possible that thought and experience are as they are. Those of his modest type aim to establish large-scale features we must conceive the world to have for it to be possible that thought and experience are as they are.
The argument I have considered belongs to neither of these types. It does not offer to establish anything about how things are, let alone must be, in the world apart from us, so it is not vulnerable to Stroud's doubts about arguments of the ambitious type.
But the way it makes itself immune to those doubts is not by weakening its conclusion to one about structural features we must conceive the world to have. The conclusion is rather one about how we must conceive the epistemic positions that are within our reach, 20 A misconception of the significance of fallibility on these lines is the topic of the passage in my Mind and World (112-3) that Wright comments on at 341, n. 13. His remarks there seem to me to miss, or ignore, the dialectical context of the passage he is commenting on.
if it is to be possible that our experience is as it is in having objective purport. That frees us to pursue our ordinary ways of finding out how things are in the world apart from us.
The specifics of what we go on to find out are not within the scope of what the argument aims to vindicate.
That might seem to distance this argument from much in Kant, who is presumably the patron saint of transcendental arguments. In sketching the argument, I have not needed to connect it with the question "How is synthetic a priori knowledge possible?", or with an investigation of the principles of the pure understanding. But there is still the fact that the argument displays its conclusion as a necessary element in the answer to a "How possible?" question about experience. Moreover, Sellars's account of how experience has its objective purport, which the argument exploits, is strikingly Kantian, in the way it represents the content of an experience as the content of a claim. Sellars links the fact that experience is of objective reality with the fact that to make a claim is to commit oneself to things being objectively thus and so. This talk of claims is Sellars's counterpart, after the "linguistic turn", to Kant's invocation of judgement. So perhaps the argument I have been considering can be seen as belonging to a minimal Kantianism. In the argument's background is an explanation of the objective purport of experience in terms of the fact that experience exemplifies forms that belong to the understanding. But in the argument as I have considered it so far, we exploit that Kantian thought without needing to concern ourselves either with how the world must be or with how we must conceive the world to be. Of course this is not the place to try to take this any further.
